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Abstract. We consider a game with a continuum of players where only a finite number of them
are atomic. Objective functions and admissible strategies may depend on the actions chosen by
atomic players and on aggregate information about the actions chosen by non-atomic players.
Only atomic players are required to have convex sets of admissible strategies and quasi-concave
objective functions.
We prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibria. Thus, we extend to large generalized
games with atomic players the results of equilibrium existence for non-atomic games of Schemeidler
(1973) and Rath (1992). We do not obtain a pure strategy equilibrium by purification of mixed
strategy equilibria. Thus, we have a direct proof of both Balder (1999, Theorem 2.1) and Balder
(2002, Theorem 2.2.1), for the case where non-atomic players have a common non-empty set of
strategies and integrable bounded codification of action profiles.
Our main result is readily applicable to many interesting problems in general equilibrium. As
an application, we extend Aumann (1966) result on the existence of equilibrium with a continuum
of traders to a standard general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets.
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21. Introduction
In a seminal paper, Schmeidler (1973) proved that in non-convex games with a continuum of
players the set of pure strategy equilibria is non-empty provided that (i) all agents are non-atomic,
and (ii) objective functions depend only on their own strategy and on the average of the actions
chosen by the other players. Essentially, this last assumption convexifies the game, as the integral
of any correspondence is a convex set (Aumann (1965)).
In this paper, we extend Schmeidler’s result to large generalized games with a finite number of
atomic players. In our framework, both objective functions and admissible strategies may depend
on the strategies of atomic players and on messages which aggregate information about strategies
chosen by non-atomic players (i.e., not necessarily on the average of these actions). By extending
the proof given by Rath (1992, Theorem 2) of Schmeidler (1973) classical result, we provide a short
and direct proof of the existence of pure Nash equilibria in large generalized game, without purifying
a mixed strategy equilibrium. Our theorem is related with equilibrium existence theorems in Balder
(1999, Theorem 2.1) and Balder (2002, Theorem 2.2.1). However, one of the merits of our proof
consist of its simplicity, as it is based only on standard fixed point arguments in compact metric
spaces.
Our theorem is general enough to cope with interesting applications. A natural application of
our result is to general equilibrium theory. Essentially, to prove equilibrium existence it is usual
to find bounds on endogenous variables and search for an equilibrium allocation as an equilibrium
in an abstract generalized game. In this type of generalized games, consumers and firms maximize
their objective functions taking prices as given, and there are atomic players that determine prices,
asset returns, taxes or any other endogenous variables that are taken as given by consumers or firms.
Thus, for equilibrium models where agents have non-convex choice sets or their objective functions
are not necessarily quasi-concave, our main result may help researchers to find an equilibrium.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present our non-convex large
generalized game and we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In Section 3, we
discuss the relation of our result with the existing literature. Finally, we apply our main result to
prove the existence of equilibrium in an incomplete markets model with non-convex preferences.
2. Pure strategy equilibria in large non-convex generalized games
Let G(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , h) be a generalized game with an infinite set of players T = T1∪T2, where
T1 is a compact metric space and T2 is a finite set of atomic players. Also, there is a σ-algebra
of subsets of T1, namely B(T1), and a finite non-atomic measure λ such that, (T1,B(T1), λ) is a
1Recently, Poblete-Cazenave and Torres-Mart´ınez (2012) apply of our result to prove equilibrium existence in a
general equilibrium model with limited-recourse collateralized loans.
3measure space. Each player t ∈ T1 has a compact and non-empty action space Kt ⊂ K̂, where K̂ is
a compact metric space and
⋂
t∈T1 Kt 6= ∅. On the other hand, each player t ∈ T2 has a compact,
convex and non-empty action space Kt ⊂ K̂t, where K̂t is a compact metric space.
A profile of actions for players in T1 is given by a function f : T1 → K̂ such that f(t) ∈ Kt, for any
t ∈ T1. Since T2 is finite, a profile of actions for the players in T2 is a vector a := (ai; i ∈ T2) ∈
∏
t∈T2
K̂t
such that, at ∈ Kt, ∀t ∈ T2. Let F(Ti) be the space of all profiles of actions of agents in Ti, with
i ∈ {0, 1}. Also, given t ∈ T2, let F−t(T2) be the set of profiles of actions a−t := (aj ; j ∈ T2 \ {t})
for players in T2 \ {t}.
In G(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , h) players do not necessarily advance the actions chosen by players in T1.
However, when making a decision, players will consider aggregate information of some characteristics
of these actions. Thus, given an action profile of non-atomic players f ∈ F(T1), each player in T will
only take into account, for strategic purposes, aggregated information coded through the message
m(f) :=
∫
T1
h(t, f(t))dλ, where h : T1 × K̂ → Rl is a continuous function.
Since we want to concentrate on action profiles for which messages are well defined, we say that
f is a strategic profile of players in T1 if both f ∈ F(T1) and h(·, f(·)) is a measurable function from
T1 to Rl. Measurability restrictions are not necessary over the behavior of atomic players. For this
reason, the set of strategic profiles of players in T2 coincides with F(T2).
The set of messages associated with strategic profiles of non-atomic players is given by
M =

∫
T1
h(t, f(t))dλ : f ∈ F(T1) ∧ h(·, f(·)) is measurable
 ⊂ Rl,
which is non-empty, because
⋂
t∈T1 Kt is a non-empty set and h is a continuous function. Also,
since K̂ and T1 are compact metric spaces, for any profile of actions f : T1 → K̂ the function
h(·, f(·)) : T1 → Rl is bounded. As T1 has finite measure, if h(·, f(·)) is measurable, then it is
integrable. For this reason, in the definition of M we only require measurability of h(·, f(·)).
In our game, the messages about the strategic profiles of players in T1 jointly with the strategic
profiles of players in T2 may restrict the set of admissible strategies available for a player t ∈ T .
That is, given a vector (m, a) ∈M ×F(T2) the strategies available for a player t ∈ T1 are given by a
set Γt(m, a) ⊂ Kt, where Γt : M ×F(T2)  Kt is a continuous correspondence with non-empty and
compact values. Analogously, given (m, a−t) ∈ M × F−t(T2), the set of strategies available for a
player t ∈ T2 is Γt(m, a−t) ⊂ Kt, where Γt : M×F−t(T2)  Kt is a continuous correspondence with
non-empty, compact and convex values. We refer to correspondences (Γt; t ∈ T ) as correspondences
of admissible strategies.
Given a set A, let U(A) be the collection of continuous functions u : A→ R. Assume that U(A) is
endowed with the sup norm topology. We suppose that each player t ∈ T1 has an objective function
4ut ∈ U(K̂×M×F(T2)), and each player t ∈ T2 has an objective function ut ∈ U(M×F(T2)) which is
quasi-concave in its own strategy. Finally, we assume that the mapping U : T1 → U(K̂×M× F(T2))
defined by U(t) = ut is measurable.2
Definition. A (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the generalized game G(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , h) is
given by strategic profiles (f∗, a∗) such that,
ut(f∗(t),m(f∗), a∗) ≥ ut(f(t),m(f∗), a∗), ∀f(t) ∈ Γt(m∗, a∗), ∀t ∈ T1;
ut(m(f∗), a∗t , a
∗
−t) ≥ ut(m(f∗), at, a∗−t), ∀at ∈ Γt(m∗, a∗−t), ∀t ∈ T2.
In our definition of Nash equilibrium, every agent maximizes his objective function, while in
Balder (1999, 2002) and Rath (1992) almost everyone maximizes. However, since objective func-
tions are continuous and action spaces compact, given an equilibrium for any of the games studied
in these articles, it is always possible to change the allocations associated with the set of non-atomic
players that do not maximize, giving to each of them an optimal strategy, without changing the
integrability of the action profile or the value of messages.
Theorem 1. Any generalized game G(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , h) has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We divide the proof into five steps.
(1) The space of messages M ⊂ Rl is non-empty, compact and convex .
As notices in the previous section, M is non-empty as
⋂
t∈T1 Kt 6= ∅. Essentially, if we fix
k ∈ ⋂t∈T1 Kt, the function g : T1 → K̂ defined by g(t) = k for any t ∈ T1 belongs to F(T1) and
h(·, g(·)) is trivially measurable. Therefore, ∫
T1
h(t, g(t))dλ is well defined and M is non-empty.
The set M is convex because the integral of a correspondence in a non-atomic measurable space
is a convex set (see Aumann (1965)): consider the correspondence Q : T1  Rl defined by Q(t) =
h(t,Kt), for any t ∈ T1. Then M =
∫
T1
Q(t)dλ is convex.3
Let Q˜ : T1  Rl be the correspondence defined by Q˜(t) = h(T1, K̂), for any t ∈ T1. Then
M =
∫
T1
Q(t)dλ ⊂ ∫
T1
Q˜(t)dλ = convexhull(h(T1, K̂)). Therefore, since h is continuous, M is a subset
of a compact set. Thus, it remains to prove that M is closed. Let {mk}k∈N ⊂ M be a sequence
that converges to a vector m ∈ Rl. Since mk ∈ M , mk =
∫
T1
hk(t)dλ, where hk : T1 → Rl is a
2Suppose that there is a finite number of types on the set of non-atomic agents, T1. That is, there is a finite
partition of T1 into measurable sets {I1, . . . , Ir} such that, two players belonging into the same element of the partition
are identical. In this case, the restriction about measurability of U is trivially satisfied.
3This follow immediately from the definition of integral of a correspondence and the fact that we do not require
action profiles to be measurable.
5mesurable function and hk = h(·, fk(·)) for some fk ∈ F(T1). For each t, {h(t, fk(t))}k∈N ⊂ Q(t),
which is a compact set. Thus, every limit point of {hk(t)}k∈N is contained in Q(t). Also, since h is
continuous, T1 is compact, and ∪t∈T1Kt ⊂ K̂, it is easy to see that {hk}k∈N is uniformly bounded
by an integrable function. By Aumann (1976), the limit point of
∫
T1
hk(t)dλ belongs to
∫
T1
Q(t)dλ.
Therefore, the space of messages is compact.
(2) Best-reply correspondences are closed with non-empty and compact values.
For any t ∈ T1, define the best-reply correspondence Bt : M ×F(T2)  Kt as
Bt(m, a) = argmaxf(t)∈Γt(m,a)ut(f(t),m, a).
Analogously, for any atomic player t ∈ T2, the best-reply correspondence Bt : M×F−t(T2)  Kt
is defined by Bt(m, a−t) = argmaxat∈Γt(m,a−t)ut(m, at, a−t). It follows that, as a consequence of
Berge’s Maximum Theorem, best-reply correspondences have closed graph and non-empty compact
values.
(3) For any atomic player t ∈ T2, his best-reply correspondence has convex values.
A direct consequence of the fact that, for players in T2, correspondences of admissible strategies
are convex valued and objective functions are quasi-concave in the own strategy.
(4) The correspondence Ω : M × F(T2)  M defined by Ω(m, a) =
∫
T1
h(t, Bt(m, a))dλ is closed
and has non-empty and convex values.
Given (m, a) ∈M ×F(T2), by identical arguments to those made by Rath (1992, pages 430-431),
there is a measurable function f ∈ F(T1) such that f(t) ∈ Bt(m, a) for any t ∈ T1. Since h is
continuous, h(·, f(·)) is measurable and, therefore, Ω has non-empty values. The correspondence
Ω has convex values, since for any (m, a) ∈ M × F(T2), the set Ω(m, a) is the integral of the
correspondence t h(t, Bt(m, a)).
Fix t ∈ T1. Since Bt has closed graph, the correspondence that associate to each (m, a) ∈
M ×F(T2) the set h(t, Bt(m, a)) has closed graph too (a direct consequence of the continuity of the
function h and the fact that Bt(m, a) ⊂ K̂ for any (t,m, a) ∈ T1 ×M ×F(T2)).
On the other hand, since T1 and K̂ are compact and h continuous, there is a bounded function
v : T1 → Rl such that −v(t) ≤ h(t, f(t)) ≤ v(t), for any t ∈ T1, f ∈ F(T1) and
∫
T1
v(t)dλ is finite.
Therefore, the correspondence that associate to each (m, a) ∈M × F(T2) the integral on T1 of the
correspondence t  h(t, Bt(m, a)) has closed graph (a consequence of the main result in Aumann
(1976)). In other words, Ω is closed.
(5) The generalized game G(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , h) has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Define Γ : M × F(T2)  M × F(T2) by Γ(m, a) = (Ω(m, a), (Bt(m, a−t))t∈T2). Then Γ is
closed and has nonempty, convex and compact values. Therefore, applying Kakutani’s Fixed Point
6Theorem, we conclude that Γ has a fixed point, i.e. there exists (m∗, a∗) ∈ M × F(T2) such that
(m∗, a∗) ∈ Γ(m∗, a∗). That is, for some f∗ ∈ F(T1), m∗ =
∫
T1
h(t, f∗(t))dλ and f∗(t) ∈ Bt(m∗, a∗),
for any t ∈ T1. Also, for any t ∈ T2, a∗t ∈ Bt(m∗, a∗−t). These properties ensure that (f∗, a∗) is a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , h). 
3. Discussion of related literature
Rath (1992, Theorem 2) result on games with compact action spaces is an elementary proof of
Schmeidler (1973) classical result. On the other hand, Balder (1999, Theorem 2.1) and Balder (2002,
Theorem 2.2.1) are generalizations of Schmeidler (1973) and Rath (1992) to generalized games. Our
theorem is related with Balder (1999, 2002) but still, it extends Rath (1992) on some dimensions,
because we consider generalized games, where admissible strategies and objective functions may
depend on atomic players actions. Different to Balder (1999), we assume that non-atomic players
has a non-empty set of common strategies.
There are generalizations of our theorem that are quite straightforward but we think they would
obscure the elementary nature of our proof. For example, we could avoid the assumption that action
spaces of non-atomic players share a common strategy and rather use an argument along Remark
8 in Rath (1992, page 432). Similar arguments to Remark 6 in Rath’s article would allow us to
avoid fixing a topology over the space of objective functions. On the other hand, we could also relax
substantially the hypothesis of our coding function h. In particular, as in Balder (1999, 2002), we
could assume that h is a vector valued function of Carathe´odory functions.
Finally, we should emphasize that one of the main differences between our theorem and Balder’s
results is the fact that we assume sets of strategic profiles to be integrable bounded codifications of
action profiles (i.e., are integrable functions—obtained by the codification of action profiles—with
respect to a finite measure space). Integrability of action profiles is something which is clearly an
ungrounded hypothesis in many applications. It makes necessary to bound actions, prove equilib-
rium existence and arguing somehow that bounds are innocuous (for example, by constructing a
sequence of equilibria for less stringent bounds and then arguing that this sequence has a convergent
subsequence that is also an equilibrium).
4. Application: Equilibria in non-convex incomplete markets economies
In this section we apply our main result to extend Aumann (1966) to economies with incomplete
asset markets. The main point is to show that, even in economies with incomplete asset markets,
one can get rid of the convexity assumption on preferences as long as there are many traders (a
continuum of traders).
7Consider an economy E with two periods, t ∈ {0, 1}, and uncertainty about the realization of the
state of nature in the second period. There is a finite set S of possible states of nature that can be
realized at t = 1, and s = 0 denotes the only state of nature at t = 0. Let S∗ = S ∪ {0}.
There is a finite set L of perfectly divisible and perishable commodities that can be demanded for
consumption in spot markets at each state of nature in the second period. We denote by ps ∈ RL+
the commodity price vector at s ∈ S and by p ∈ RL×S+ the vector of commodity spot prices in the
economy. There exists a finite set J of nominal assets. One unit of asset j ∈ J delivers a payment
Ns,j when state of nature s ∈ S is reached. We denote Assets are available in a perfectly competitive
spot market in the first period. Let q ∈ RJ be the unitary asset price vector at t = 0 and assume
all assets are in zero net supply.
There is a set of agents H = [0, 1]–endowed with the Lebesgue measure–that want to reallocate
their income through states of nature using financial assets. Given prices (p, q), each agent t ∈ [0, 1]
maximizes his utility U t : RL×S+ → R (that represent his preferences over consumption) choosing
an allocation in his budget set Bt(p, q), defined as the set of consumption and financial allocations
(x, z) ∈ RL×S+ × RJ that satisfy,∑
j∈J
qjzj ≤ 0; psxs ≤ pswts +
∑
j∈J
Ns,jzj , ∀s ∈ S.
where wt := (wts; s ∈ S) ∈ RL×S+ is the initial endowment of commodities of agent t ∈ [0, 1].
We assume that (p, q) ∈ 4S ×Q, where 4 = {p ∈ RL+ : ‖p‖ = 1}, Q = {q ∈ RJ+ : ‖q‖ = 1} , and
given x ∈ Rm, ‖x‖ ≡
m∑
i=1
|xi|. As in the previous section, let U(RL×S+ ) be the space of real valued
continuous functions over RL×S+ with the sup norm topology.
Definition. A competitive equilibrium for the economy E is given by a vector of prices (p, q) ∈
4S × Q, jointly with consumption and financial allocations (xt, zt) ∈ RL×S+ × RJ for each agent
t ∈ [0, 1], such that,
(1) For almost all t ∈ [0, 1],
(
xt, zt
) ∈ argmax(x,z)∈Bt(p,q)U t(x);
(2) Commodity and financial markets clear. That is,∫
[0,1]
xtsdt =
∫
[0,1]
wtsdt, ∀s ∈ S;
∫
[0,1]
ztjdt = 0, ∀j ∈ J.
A standard technique for proving the existence of competitive equilibrium in convex economies
with incomplete asset markets is to truncate the space of assets and commodities (see Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986)), prove existence of equilibrium for this truncated economy and then, by
8relaxing these bounds, show that the sequence of equilibriums of the bounded economies converge
to an equilibrium of the original (unbounded) economy. We will follow the same approach on our
context.
Let K ⊂ RS×L+ × RJ . Given prices (p, q) ∈ 4S × Q, for each individual t ∈ [0, 1], consider the
truncated budget set Bt(p, q;K) := Bt(p, q) ∩ K. A K-truncated competitive equilibrium for the
economy E is given by prices and allocations
(
(p, q);
(
xt, zt
)
t∈[0,1]
)
such that, agents maximize on
the truncated budget constraints and commodity and financial markets clear.
The most important point of the next results is that, although utility functions are not necessarily
quasi-concave, we can prove the existence of a truncated competitive equilibrium using our main
result about existence of pure strategy equilibria in non-convex continuous generalized games with
atomic players. Our prove is in the same spirit of Debreu (1952) prove of the existence of equilibrium
in social games.
Proposition. Consider an economy E and let K = [0, k1]S×L × [−k0, k0]J .
Assume that the following conditions hold:
(a) The mapping w : [0, 1] → RL×S++ given by w(t) = wt is integrable and bounded. Thus, there
is W ∈ R such that, ‖wt‖ ≤W, ∀t ∈ [0, 1].
(b) For any t ∈ [0, 1], U t is continuous and strictly increasing.
(c) The map t→ U t is measurable.
(d) Assets are not trivial: for any j ∈ J , Nj := (Ns,j ; s ∈ S) ∈ RS+ \ {0}.
(e) k0 > W and k1 > W + k0
∑
(s,j)∈S×J
Ns,j.
Then, there is a K-truncated competitive equilibrium for the economy E.
Proof. We divide the proof in three steps.
(A) Equilibrium existence in an abstract generalized game GK .
Consider a generalized game GK = GK(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , h) where the set of players is T =
[0, 1] ∪ S∗. For each player t ∈ [0, 1], the space of actions is Kt = K. For the atomic player s = 0,
let K0 = Q and for s ∈ S, let Ks = 4. We denote by (xt, zt) the actions of a player t ∈ [0, 1], by q
the actions of s = 0, and by ps the actions of any player s ∈ S.
Let h : K → K be the identity function. Thus, the space of messages is
M =

∫
[0,1]
(xt, zt)dt : (x, z) : [0, 1]→ K measurable
 .
The correspondence of admissible strategies of a player t ∈ [0, 1], Γt : M×4S×Q K is defined
by Γt(m, p, q) = Bt(p, q;K). For s = 0 define Γs : M ×4S  K0 by Γs(m, p) = K0, and for any
9s ∈ S define Γs : M ×4(S−1) ×Q Ks by Γt(m, p−s, q) = Ks, where p−s stands for the vector p
with ps deleted.
For any t ∈ [0, 1], ut = U t. Also, objective function for players s ∈ S∗ are given by,
Us(m, p, q) = q ·
∫
[0,1]
ztjdt, if s = 0;
Us(m, p, q) = ps ·
∫
[0,1]
(xts − wts)dt, if s ∈ S.
By definition, players’ action spaces are non-empty and compact. Assumption (a) ensures that,
for any t ∈ [0, 1], the correspondence of admissible strategies Γt is continuous with non-empty and
compact values. Since 4 and Q are non-empty, compact and convex, it follows that, for any s ∈ S∗,
the correspondence Γs is continuous and have non-empty, convex and compact values. Objective
functions are by hypothesis continuous and, for any s ∈ S∗, Us is linear in its own strategy and,
therefore, quasi-concave on this strategy. Therefore, it follows from Theorem 1 that the generalized
game GK(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , h) has a pure strategy Nash equilibria.
(B) In any Nash equilibrium of GK , non-atomic players have binding budget constraints.
If for some t ∈ [0, 1] the first period budget constraint is non-binding, then zt = (k0, ..., k0). Thus,
it follows from hypothesis (e) that, W = W ‖q‖ < ∑
j∈J
qjk0 < 0, a contradiction. Analogously, if
for some non-atomic player t the budget constraint at state of nature s ∈ S is non-binding, then
xts = (k1, ..., k1). In this case, k1 = ps ·xts < ps ·wts +
∑
j∈J Ns,jz
t
j ≤
∑
l∈L w
t
s,l +
∑
j∈J Ns,jk0 < k1,
which is a contradiction.
(C) Any Nash equilibrium of GK is a K-truncated competitive equilibrium of E.
Let
(
(p, q); (xt, zt)t∈[0,1]
)
be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of GK(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , h). As a
consequence of the previous step, it follows that,
q
∫
[0,1]
ztdt ≤ q
∫
[0,1]
ztdt = 0, ∀q ∈ Q.
Evaluating inequality above in the canonical vectors of RJ+–which belongs to Q–we have that,∫
[0,1]
ztjdt ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ J.
Thus, for any s ∈ S, we have that
ps
∫
[0,1]
(xts − wts)dt =
∑
j∈J
Ns,j
∫
[0,1]
ztjdt ≤ 0.
Therefore,
ps
∫
[0,1]
(xts − wts)dt ≤ 0, ∀(s, ps) ∈ S ×4,
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which implies that, for any (l, s) ∈ L× S,∫
[0,1]
(xts,l − wts,l)dt ≤ 0.
On the other hand, since for any t ∈ [0, 1] the utility function U t is strictly increasing, commodity
and asset prices are strictly positive. Indeed, if there is l ∈ L such that ps,l = 0, for some s ∈ S,
then each player t ∈ [0, 1] set xts,l = k1 and, therefore, k1 =
∫
[0,1]
xts,ldt ≤
∫
[0,1]
wts,ldt ≤ W < k1, a
contradiction. Analogously, if qj = 0 for some j ∈ J , then each agent t ∈ [0, 1] chose ztj = k0 and,
therefore, k0 =
∫
[0,1]
ztjdt ≤ 0, a contradiction.
Since (p, q)  0 and individuals’ budget constraints are binding at each state of nature s ∈ S∗,
it follows that, ∫
[0,1]
(xts − wts)dt = 0, ∀s ∈ S;
∫
[0,1]
ztjdt = 0, ∀j ∈ J.
We conclude that the pure strategy equilibrium of GK(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , h) is a K-truncated com-
petitive equilibrium for the economy E . 
Departing from the previous Proposition, we will prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium
for E using an asymptotic argument. This is done by calculating a limit of K-truncated competitive
equilibria when the size of K increases. To apply these technics, we need to ensure that financial
position are uniformly bounded from below (bounded short-sales).
In models with nominal assets and finitely many agents, short-sales can be endogenously bounded,
using second period budget constraints and monotonicity of preferences. Indeed, optimal portfolios
are the solution of a linear system which depends of prices and consumption allocations, parameters
that are in compact sets when there is a finite number of agents.
However, the presence of a continuum of agents in our model, implies that equilibrium consump-
tion allocations are not necessarily (ex-ante) uniformly bounded. For these reason, we require an
additional condition over the financial structure, a kind of non-arbitrage requirement: independently
of financial prices, agents can not have access to unbounded resources at first period without promise
unbounded payments at second period (see the statement of Theorem 2).
Remark. As will become clear in the proof of Theorem 2, equilibrium existence can be ensured
without any non-arbitrage requirement over the financial structure, provided that exogenous short-
sale constraints be imposed. In any case, in our model we can allow for assets whose payments
continuously depends on prices (i.e. real assets or derivatives). However, for simplicity of notation,
we restrict our atention to nominal securities.
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Theorem 2. Under Assumptions (a)-(e), assume that asset payments N = (Ns,j)(s,j)∈S×J avoids
arbitrage opportunities, in the sense that,
∀a > 0 ∃b > 0 : Nz ≥ −a(1, . . . , 1) =⇒ min
q∈Q
qz ≥ −b.
Then, there exists a competitive equilibrium of E .
Proof. Given n ∈ N, let Kn = [0, kn]S×L × [−n, n]J , where kn = 2
(
W + n
∑
s,j
Ns,j
)
. It follows
from Proposition 1 that, for any n > W there is aKn-truncated equilibrium
(
(pn, qn), (xtn, z
t
n)t∈[0,1]
)
.
On the one hand, there is ẑ > 0 such that, ztn,j > −ẑ, ∀(t, j) ∈ [0, 1] × J, ∀n > W .4 Thus,
the sequence of integrable functions {gn : [0, 1] → RL×S × RJ}n>W defined by gn(t) = (xtn, ztn)
is uniformly bounded from below by an integrable function. On the other hand, since ∆S × Q is
compact, there is a subsequence {(pnk , qnk)}k∈N of {(pn, qn)}n>W which converges to a vector of
prices (p˜, q˜) ∈ ∆S ×Q.
Given a subset of an Euclidean space, A ∈ Rm, let CL(A) be the set of cluster points of A.
It follows from considerations above that, applying the weak version of multidimensional Fatou’s
Lemma (see Hildenbrand (1974, page 69)), we can find allocations (x˜t, z˜t)t∈[0,1] ⊂ RL×S+ × RJ such
that,
(i) For any (l, j) ∈ L× J ,(∫
[0,1]
x˜tldt,
∫
[0,1]
z˜tjdt
)
≤ lim
k→+∞
(∫
[0,1]
xtnk,ldt,
∫
[0,1]
ztnk,jdt
)
=
(∫
[0,1]
wtldt, 0
)
.
(ii) There is a full measure set H1 ⊆ [0, 1] such that, for any t ∈ H1,
(x˜t, z˜t) ∈ CL({(xtnk , ztnk)}k∈N).
Claim A. For any t ∈ H1, the allocation (x˜t, z˜t) belongs on the budget set Bt(p˜, q˜) and it is an
optimal choice at prices (p˜, q˜).
Proof. Fix t ∈ H1. The allocation (x˜t, z˜t) ∈ Bt(p˜, q˜), a consequence of item (ii) above and the
closed graph property of Bt. Let Nt ⊂ N be a set of indexes such that {(xtnk , ztnk)}k∈Nt con-
verges to (x˜t, z˜t). Given any allocation (xt, zt) ∈ Bt(p˜, q˜), the lower hemicontinuity of Bt ensures
that there is a sequence {(x˙tnk , z˙nk)}k∈Nt which converges to (xt, zt) such that, for any k ∈ Nt,
(x˙tnk , z˙nk) ∈ Bt(pnk , qnk). Thus, for any k ∈ Nt, U t(x˙tnk) ≤ U t(xtnk). Taking the limit as k goes to
4For any n > W and t ∈ [0, 1], it follows from second period budget constraints that, −(pnwts; s ∈ S) ≤ Nztn.
Therefore, Assumption (a) guarantees that −W (1, . . . , 1) ≤ Nztn. Thus, as for any z ∈ RJ , min
q∈Q
qz = min
j∈J
zj , the non-
arbitrage condition imposed in the statement of Theorem 2 guarantees that there exists bz > 0 such that ztn,j ≥ −bz.
Since this lower bound is independent of (n, t), {ztn}t∈[0,1] is a bounded from below subset of RJ .
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infinity, we obtain that U t(xt) ≤ U t(x˜t). That is, (x˜t, z˜t) is an optimal choice at prices (p˜, q˜). 
It follows from Claim A and the monotonicity of preferences (Assumption (b)) that (p˜, q˜)  0.
Thus, there exists  > 0, m∗ ∈ N, such that, (p˜, q˜)  (1, . . . , 1) and, for any nk > m∗, we have
‖(p˜, q˜)− (pnk , qnk)‖ < . Particularly, for any nk > m∗, (pnk , qnk) 0.
Fix t ∈ [0, 1]. It follows from the first period budget constraint that,
−ẑ < ztnk,j ≤
ẑ(#J − 1)
qnkj
< Z := max
j∈J
ẑ(#J − 1)
q˜j −  , ∀nk > m
∗, ∀j ∈ J.
Also, second period budget constraints ensure that, for any s ∈ S,
0 ≤ xtnk,s,l ≤
W +
∑
j∈J Ns,jZ
pnkl
<
W +
∑
j∈J Ns,jZ
p˜l −  , ∀nk > m
∗,∀l ∈ L.
It follows that {gnk(t)}nk>m∗ is bounded. Moreover, since the upper bound of {gnk(t)}nk>m∗
does not depend on the identity of t ∈ [0, 1], we conclude that {gnk}nk>m∗ are uniformly integrable
functions (see Hildenbrand (1974, page 52)). Therefore, applying the strong version of Fatou’s
Lemma (see Hildenbrand (1974, page 69)), we obtain allocations (xt, zt)t∈[0,1] ⊂ RL×S+ × RJ such
that,
(iii) For any (l, j) ∈ L× J ,(∫
[0,1]
xtldt,
∫
[0,1]
ztjdt
)
= lim
k→+∞
(∫
[0,1]
xtnk,ldt,
∫
[0,1]
ztnk,jdt
)
=
(∫
[0,1]
wtldt, 0
)
.
(iv) There is a full measure set H2 ⊆ [0, 1] such that, for any t ∈ H2,
(xt, zt) ∈ CL({(xtnk , ztnk)}k∈N).
It follows from item (iii) that allocations (xt, zt)t∈[0,1] ⊂ RL×S+ ×RJ satisfy market clear conditions
of equilibrium definition. Moreover, analogous arguments to those made in Claim A ensure that,
for any agent t ∈ H2, (xt, zt) belongs on the budget set Bt(p˜, q˜) and it is an optimal choice at prices
(p˜, q˜). That is,
(
(p˜, q˜), (xt, zt)t∈[0,1]
)
is an equilibrium of E . 
5. Concluding remarks
We analyzed the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large non-convex generalized games.
Inspired by Rath (1992), we used simple arguments of mathematical analysis to obtain our result.
Pure strategy Nash equilibria appear as fixed points of a convex valued correspondence, rather than
by purification of mixed strategy equilibria, as in Balder (1999, 2002).
Our result is a tool to prove general equilibrium existence in non-convex economies. To illustrate
this possibility, we applied our main result to prove existence of equilibria in a non-convex incomplete
markets economy. Recently, Poblete-Cazenave and Torres-Mart´ınez (2012) also applied Theorem 1
to analyze the existence of equilibrium in economies with limited-recourse collateralized loans.
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